Group Selection  Simulator 0674930460_m.gif (14899 bytes)

For the last two decades, biologist David Sloan Wilson has been engaged in a sustained reassessment of group selection theory in evolutionary biology and ecology. Group selection theory centers on the claim that selection in structured populations can result in the stabilization of group level adaptations - traits that are good for the group even though they put individuals carrying those traits at a competitive disadvantage within the group. It is thought that group selection is the key to understanding the evolution of altruism, morality, and cooperation. For the last five years or so, Wilson has been joined by philosopher Elliott Sober in this enterprise. The result of this collaboration is a (highly recommended) new book: Unto Others: the evolution and psychology of unselfish behavior.


Simpson's Paradox: Part of Sober and Wilson's argument is that the standard ways of explaining the evolution of unselfish behavior, which include "kin selection", "reciprocal altruism", and non-random interaction patterns, are in fact kinds of group selection, in that the stabilization of self-sacrificing behavior patterns in these models depends critically on group structure. To this collection of standard models, they propose an additional mechanism by which self-sacrificing behavior can stabilize.

The paradigm for understanding the evolution of altruism is a game called the Prisoner's Dilemma. Each time two individuals interact, each "player" has the choice of either cooperating or defecting. How well each player does depends on what both players do. Typical payoffs are given in the following matrix. In the long run everyone does better if everyone cooperates. In the short run, however, defectors do better, no matter which move their opponents make.

Payoffs: Player 2: Cooperate Player 2: Defect
Player 1: Cooperate 3,3 1,4
Player 1: Defect 4,1 2,2

Evolutionary models interpret the payoffs as darwinian finess, or competitive growth rates. In populations where cooperators and defectors interact at random, defection always displaces cooperation within a local population (or group). This is true even in a structured population where individuals only play against members of their own group. In any group which has a mix of cooperators and defectors, the percentage of cooperators decreases. In groups that aren't mixed, there is no change in percentages. So it seems, at first glance, as though group structure by itself isn't enough to stabilize cooperatvie behavior.

Simpson's paradox consists of the following observation: even though a trait is decreasing in percentage in every group, this doesn't mean that it is decreasing overall.   The reason that this is possible is because group sizes change, and groups with lots of cooperators grow faster than groups of mostly defectors. Suppose we start with two populations with 100 indifividuals each, the first consisting of 10% cooperators and the second consisting of 90% cooperators. Using the growth rates in the table above, for the first generation we get:

Simpson's
Paradox
Group 1 Group 2 Combined
Def Coop Tot %Coop Def Coop Tot %Coop Def Coop %Coop
Generation 1 90 10 100 10% 10 90 100 90% 100 100 50%
Generation 2 198 12 210 5.7% 38 252 290 86.9% 236 264 52.8%

So even though the percentage of cooperators decreases in both groups, the percentage   of cooperators increases in the overall population. Of course this effect can't be maintained, since defectors will end up taking over every population, and the percentage of cooperators in the total population will drop.

Sober and Wilson propose, however, that if groups break up and reform at the right rate, then the "Simpson's paradox effect" can be sustained. One way that this could happen would be if cooperators tended to find each other to form new groups. S&W argue, however, that even in the absence of such selective assortment mechanisms, cooperation can stabilize. The trick is that when groups reform at random, they do not all resemble the overall population in their proportions of cooperators. Some will accidentally end up with more cooperators, others with fewer. And those groups with more cooperators will grow faster than those without. So the proposal is that sampling error in group composition can be enough to sustain cooperation in structured populations. We configured the EAME agent-and-patch simulator to explore this proposal.


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